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Abstract The effects of two popular second-best clean energy policies are analysed using
an extended Hotelling-type resource extraction framework. This model features, first, het-
erogenous energy sources and, second, a capacity-constrained backstop technology. This
setup allows for capturing the following two empirical observations. First, different types of
energy sources are used simultaneously despite different production cost. Second, experi-
ences from various European countries show that a further expansion of the use of climate
friendly technologies faces substantial technological as well as political constraints. We use
this framework to analyse if under two policy scenarios a so-called “Green Paradox” occurs.
A subsidy for the clean energy as well as an expansion of the capacity of the clean energy are
considered. The analysis shows that under plausible parameter values both policy measures
lead to a weak Green Paradox; however a strong Green Paradox is only found for the capac-
ity expansion scenario. In addition, the subsidy is found to be welfare enhancing while the
capacity increase is welfare enhancing only if the cost of adding the capacity is sufficiently
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small.We also show the effects of the policies crucially depend on the initial capacity and
that under certain scenarios even an “extreme” Green Paradox is found.
Keywords Capacity constraints · Green Paradox · Climate change · Simultaneous resource
use · Cost reversal
JEL Classification Q38 · Q54 · H23
1 Introduction
The decarbonisation of the global economy is very high on the global political agenda. As
various types of clean technologies are available, the situation looks generally promising:
Wind as well as solar energy generally could replace conventional fossil fuel power plants;
thus, electricity generation potentially could become considerably cleaner. The situation in
the transport sector is similar: biofuels have the potential to replace conventional fuels. What
is more, a considerable political will is evident, and has manifested itself in various types of
policy measures such as feed-in tariffs for renewable energy or biofuel mandates.
However, this decarbonisation process necessarily involves nothing short of an entire
reconstruction of the global energy sector. Thus, it is clearly not an easy task. It is not just
that this process is of large scale and involves complex investment projects with very long
horizons, it also seems to meet increasing resistance in the population. To name just a few
examples, land used for production of biofuels reduces the land areas for growing food.
This results in concerns about food security and sustainability. As long as more advanced
technologies such as second generation biofuels are not yet available, the situation looks
difficult. On the electricity generation front, the situation is similar: in countries such as
Germany and the United Kingdom, the installation of additional wind generation capacities
becomes increasingly difficult as it finds insufficient support in many local communities.
An additional challenge in this context is the installation of enormous amounts of electricity
transmission capacities—this is often equally unwelcome. Greatly improved energy storage
technologies would certainly be very helpful in this regard but are not available yet.
The consequence of these challenges is that while clean technologies are certainly used
in various countries, in particular in Europe, the available capacities are not sufficient for
meeting the complete energy demand and, in addition, expanding the use of clean energies
is getting increasingly complicated. This constitutes a major explanation of two empirical
facts. First, both fossil energy and clean energy are produced simultaneously even though the
latter is still considerably more expensive than the former. Second, climate friendly energy is
used but its capacity is severely constrained. Further expansions are challenging because of
technological and/or political constraints. To capture these two empirical observations, our
paper proposes a resource extraction model with an exhaustible resource stock in competition
with a capacity-constrained clean backstop.1
This framework is then used to analyse two different scenarios. First, assuming that the
first-best carbon tax is not politically feasible, we consider the introduction of a subsidy on
the clean technology. Subsidizing the clean energy sector is a very common and popular
second-best policy measure. Second, the effect of an expansion of the capacity—an increase
1 In a working paper version (Grondwald et al. 2016), we modify the multi-deposit model of Holland (2003)
and consider the case with several heterogeneous dirty resources; this reflects the simultaneous use of e.g.
both conventional and unconventional oil. The results are broadly similar, except there is a jump in emissions
when the more dirty oil replaces the conventional oil.
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in the availability—of the backstop is analysed. This can be more broadly interpreted, to
include the sudden availability of a new technology which allows using clean technologies
to a much larger extent, e.g. a breakthrough in areas such as advanced biofuels or energy
storage. The latter would allow a massive increase in the use of renewable electricity. Tech-
nological breakthroughs of this type may be the result of a public policy such as research and
development subsidies. The effects on the extraction path of the dirty exhaustible resource
and on the total welfare are analysed. Specifically, we ask if there are negative consequences
for the climate when second-best policies are implemented. As Sinn (2008) puts it: is there a
Green Paradox? The analysis conducted in this paper involves both analytical and numerical
parts; the calibration of the numerical part is based on empirical data on the global crude oil
market. The analysis, finally, employs the notions of a “weak Green Paradox” and a “strong
Green Paradox” introduced by Gerlagh (2011). The former describes a short-term increase
of anthropogenic emissions in response to a policy measure, the latter an increase in cumula-
tive damages. In addition, we also introduce the concept of an extreme Green Paradox: this
captures a decrease in welfare caused by well-intentioned but poorly designed climate policy
measures.
Our numerical analysis shows that, under our base-line specification of parameter values,
whereas both policy measures lead to a weak Green Paradox, a strong Green Paradox is only
found for the capacity expansion scenario. In addition, the subsidy is found to be welfare
enhancing while the capacity increase is welfare enhancing only if the cost of adding the
capacity is sufficiently small. In terms of the present value of the stream of damage costs,
we find that a subsidy of 25% on the clean energy will reduce total damage costs by about
6%, while a capacity expansion of 20% will increase total damage costs by about 2.5%. The
reason is that a subsidy makes clean energy production profitable at an earlier date, resulting
in pushing the fossil resource exhaustion date further into the future, so that the pollution
stock peaks at a later date. In contrast, a capacity expansion reduces the maximum price that
the last drop of oil would earn, and has a negative effect on the residual demand for oil. These
effects give a strong incentive for fossil resource owners to pump more oil out in the earlier
stage. A sensitivity analysis we conduct shows that an extreme Green Paradox—a decrease in
welfare—occurs when the damages associated with carbon emissions are sufficiently high.
In addition, we also find that the effects crucially depend on the initial size of the capacity.
Assuming that the climate friendly backstop technology is capacity constrained makes
a significant contribution to the Green Paradox literature.2 Up to now, all papers which
contain a backstop technology assume that at some point a backstop technology becomes
(economically) available in unlimited amounts and replaces conventional energy sources
completely.3 Our assumption of a capacity constrained backstop technology allows for the
analysis of a completely new scenario: what are the consequences of an increase in the
availability of clean energy? Hoel (2011) contributes to the “traditional” backstop technology
using a two-country model. His analysis shows that the degree of country heterogeneity has
significant effects on how subsidies or taxes on the one hand and emissions paths on the other
are related. van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012a, b) offer an interesting refinement: they show
that the cost of a backstop technology are essential for the existence or non-existence of a
Green Paradox outcome. If the backstop is relatively expensive and, thus, full exhaustion of
the non-renewable resource is optimal, a Green Paradox occurs. However, if the backstop
2 van der Ploeg and Withagen (2015) as well as Jensen et al. (2015) provide excellent overviews of the Green
Paradox literature.
3 The more the capacity constraint is relaxed, the more the clean substitute becomes a “classic” backstop
technology. We model the backstop technology in line with Dasgupta and Heal (1974), as a “perfectly durable
commodity, which provides a flow of services at constant rate.”
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is sufficiently cheap this finding is reversed. Hoel and Jensen’s (2012) paper also consider
different types of climate friendly technologies and show e.g. that carbon capture and storage
can have different effects than renewable energies. Michielsen (2014), in contrast, considers
a more refined dirty resource sector. His paper shows that, under certain conditions, the
anticipation of a climate policy can actually reduce current emissions: a so-called Green
Orthodox occurs. A key factor of his model is the degree of substitutability between the dirty
resources. Grafton et al. (2012) analyse the effects of biofuel subsidies. Their paper shows
that whether or not a Green Paradox occurs depends on factors such as the extraction cost of
the fossil resource and/or marginal cost of using biofuels.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we derive a model of
substitute production under a capacity constraint. Section 3 describes the first-best solution;
Sects. 4 and 5 discuss two feasible policy scenarios and a sensitivity analysis. Section 6
illustrates the policy relevance of this paper. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2 A Model of Substitute Production Under Capacity Constraint
Assume that there is an aggregate stock of fossil fuels, denoted by S. The constant per unit
extraction cost is denoted by c. There is no capacity constraint on the amount of extraction
at any given point of time t . The cumulative extraction constraint is
∫ ∞
0
q(t)dt ≤ S(0).
The rate of extraction is denoted by q . Then we have S˙(t) = −q(t), with S(0) = S0.
Following van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012a, b), we assume a pollution decay rate of zero.
Then the stock of pollution, denoted by X , evolves according to the rule X˙ = ηq , with
X (0) = X0, given. Here η is the pollution content per unit. The maximum possible stock of
pollution is X , where X = X0 + ηS0. The damage cost at time t depends on the stock X (t).
The damage function is denoted by G(X). We assume that G ′(X) > 0 and G ′′(X) ≥ 0.
There is a clean energy that is a perfect substitute for the fossil fuels. Let qg(t)be the amount
of clean energy produced at time t . The key contribution of this paper is the assumption that
there is a capacity constraint on clean energy production: qg(t) ≤ qg , where the subscript g
is used for the clean (or ‘green’) energy. This means that at each point of time, the amount
of clean energy that can be produced is exogenously determined by the capacity constraint.
Let cg be the constant unit cost of production of the clean energy. Assume cg > c.
Let Q(t) = q(t) + qg(t) denote the aggregate supply of energy at time t , where some
of these outputs may be zero. The utility of consuming Q(t) is U [Q(t)], where U (·) is a
strictly concave and increasing function and U ′(0) can be finite or infinite. The instantaneous
welfare at time t is
W (t) = U (Q(t)) − cq(t) − cgqg(t) − G(X (t)) (1)
Consumer’ demand is represented by the condition p = U ′(Q). Inverting this function,
we obtain the demand function Q = D(p), D′(p) < 0. We assume that when the price of
energy is equal to cg , the market demand for energy exceeds the capacity qg . We denote by
p the consumer’s marginal utility when energy consumption is at the green capacity level,
qg , i.e. D(p) = qg .
Our first task is to characterize the equilibrium in the perfect competition situation, in
the absence of a carbon tax. The resource owners follow a Hotelling-type extraction path,
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maximizing the value of the resource stock such that the resource rent increases at the rate
of interest. Since the renewable resource owners do not have to optimise intertemporarily,
their supply behaviour is different from that of the exhaustible resource owners. In the next
subsection we impose a condition which ensures that the green energy is not produced during
some initial phase.
2.1 Extraction in the Absence of a Carbon Tax
We will consider a scenario with a subsidy rate s ≥ 0 per unit of clean energy, and restrict s
to belong to some closed interval [0, s], where s is the maximum subsidy that is politically
feasible. The clean energy firms’s private unit cost is defined as its unit production cost
minus the subsidy, c#g(s) = cg − s. We assume that c#g (s) > c, for all politically feasible
s ∈ [0, s]. Thus the marginal cost of extracting the fossil resource is lower than the clean
energy firms’ private unit cost. When p(t) reaches c#g(s), demand must be met from both
the clean energy sector and fossil fuel extraction. For all p in the range
[
c#g(s), p
]
, the clean
energy will always be produced at maximum capacity. Given the limited green capacity qg ,
the equilibrium price of energy can never exceed p ≡ U ′(qg).
Throughout most of the analysis, we assume that the initial size of the exhaustible
resource stock, S0, is large enough so that in the absence of a subsidy the clean energy
is uncompetive during some initial time interval. Let us formalize this condition. Let x
denote the number of years it would take for the price p to rise from p = cg to p = p, i.e.,
x = (1/r) [ln (p − c) − ln (cg − c)]. Let t∗ be the time at which the energy price reaches
cg and T the time of resource exhaustion, i.e., p(T ) = p. We assume that S0 is sufficiently
large, such that
S0 >
∫ T
t∗
D(p(t))dt − (T − tg) qg ≡
∫ x
0
D
[
c + (cg − c) erτ ] dτ − xqg ≡ S˜ (2)
For ease of reference, we label the required condition as Condition 1.4
2.2 Three Phases of Resource Utilization and the Price Path
The equilibrium path of the energy price is continuous and the resource use pattern can be
described as follows.
Phase 1: Energy is supplied only by extraction from the exhaustible resource stock. This
phase ends at an endogenously determined time t#g > 0, such that the price at time t#g is equal
to c#g(s). During this phase, the net price of the fossil resource, p(t) − c, rises at a rate equal
to the interest rate r .5
Phase 2: Energy is simultaneously supplied by extraction from the resource deposit S
and the (more costly) renewable energy running at its capacity level qg . This phase begins
4 When there is a subsidy s ∈ [0, s], there will still be an initial phase where the only energy source comes
from the fossil fuels, if the following stronger condition, called Condition 1b, is satisfied:
S0 > S˜#(s) ≡
∫ x#(s)
0
D
[
c +
(
c#g(s) − c
)
erτ
]
dτ − x#(s)qg
where x#(s) is the number of years it would take for the price p to rise from p = c#g(s) to p = p, that is,
x#(s) = (1/r)
[
ln (p − c) − ln
(
c#g(s) − c
)]
.
5 Note that since p(t∗) = cg , we have t#g < t∗ if there is a positive subsidy s per unit of clean energy.
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at time t#g and ends at an endogenously determined T , at which time the resource stock S is
exhausted. During this phase the resource rent, p(t) − c, continues to rise at rate r .
Phase 3: The only source of energy is clean energy, available at capacity level qg . The
price is constant at p. This phase begins at time T and continues for ever.
At time t#g the clean energy sector’s supply qg is not enough to meet the demand D(c#g(s)).
The shortfall, called residual demand, is met at time t#g by extraction from the exhaustible,
such that qg +q(t#g ) = D(c#g(s)). From time t#g on, only the residual demand must be met by
the exhaustible resource, indicating that the existence of a constrained renewable resource
alleviates the scarcity problem of the exhaustible resources.
2.3 Numerical Analysis
In addition to theoretical analyses, this paper also offers a numerical illustration coupled
with a sensitivity analysis. This section briefly summarises parameter choices of the based
line scenario. The general aim is to capture relationships observable in the global crude oil
market. We set qg = 5, r = 0.01, c = 1.25, and cg = 4. Moreover, we assume linear demand,
D(p) = A − p, where A = 20. This implies p = 15. To compute the pollution stock, we
specify the stock size S0. We assume S0 = 2000, which is an aggregation of conventional oil
reserves and non-conventional oil reserves.6 The ratio between marginal costs of fossil fuel
extraction and green energy approximately matches the ratio between c = 1.25 and cg = 4
used in this paper.7 The remaining parameters are chosen arbitrarily.
3 The First-Best Scenario
In this section, we consider the first-best scenario. We assume that the social planner chooses
the time path of extraction q(t) and supply of renewable energy qg(t) to maximize the integral
of the discounted stream of instantaneous welfare∫ ∞
0
e−r t W (t)dt
where W (t) is given by (1), subject to q(t) ≥ 0, qg(t) ≥ 0, qg − qg(t) ≥ 0, S˙(t) = −q(t),
S(0) = S0, S(t) ≥ 0, and X˙(t) = ηq(t), X (0) = X0.
3.1 Characterizing the Planner’s Solution
Applying standard optimal control techniques (Leonard and Long 1992), we can show that
(see supplementary material, available online) the planner’s solution implies a shadow price
which can be interpreted as the social cost of carbon. It is given by
μ(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−r(τ−t)G ′(X (τ ))dτ
The following assumption will ensure that the resource stock will be exhausted at some finite
time:
6 In our working paper version (Grondwald et al. 2016), we take account of the heterogeneity of the oil
reserves. The results reported in the present paper and in the working paper are broadly the same.
7 In our working paper version, the marginal extraction costs of conventional oils and non-conventional oils
are set at c1 = 0.75 and c2 = 1.75. Here we set c = 1.25; it is an average of c1 and c2.
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Assumption A1 The marginal damage cost when the pollution stock is at its maximum
level, G ′(X), is small enough so that
η
G ′(X)
r
+ c < U ′(qg) (3)
This assumption means that even the last drop of oil has a positive marginal contribution to
social welfare. Under Assumption A1, the economy will eventually reach a steady state when
the resource stock has been completely exhausted. The steady-state instantaneous welfare
level is W = U (q) − cgq − G
(
X
)
. At the steady state, the social cost of carbon is equal to
the present value of the marginal damage flow: μ = G ′(X)/r .
At the steady state, the price of energy is p ≡ U ′(qg) while the marginal production cost of
clean energy is cg < U ′(qg). The “profit” flow to the clean energy producers is
[
p − cg
]
qg .
This “profit” is the quasi-rent earned by owners of the fixed capacity qg . Clearly, because
p > cg , it is optimal to use the clean energy source before the exhaustion of the fossil
resources.
For the remainder of the paper, we consider a special case of the model: we assume that
the damage cost function is linear in the pollution stock: G(X) = βX where β > 0. This
assumption allows us to have an explicit solution of the model. Then the social cost of carbon
is constant over time, μ(t) = β/r = μ. Using Hotelling’s Rule, at any two dates t and t ′
such the extraction from the stock S is strictly positive, it holds that
[p(t) − (c + μη)] e−r t = [p(t ′) − (c + μη)] e−r t ′ (4)
It follows that the analysis of the three phases of the BAU scenario applies also to the
first-best scenario, provided we replace c with (c + μη). For the first-best scenario, the
counter-part of Condition 1 is
Condition 1∗ : S(0) > S∗ ≡
∫ x∗
0
D
[
c + μη + (cg − (c + μη)) erτ ] dτ − x∗q
where x∗ = (1/r) [ln (p − c − μη) − ln (cg − c − μη)]. For details, please refer to the
online Appendix.
3.2 Calculation of Welfare in the First-Best Scenario
Let t∗ be the time at which the price reaches the production cost cg , so that clean energy
begins to be supplied. The social welfare in the first-best scenario is the sum of welfare levels
of the three successive phases, W = W1 + W2 + W3, where Wi (i = 1, 2, 3) are defined as
follows:
W1 =
∫ t∗
0
e−r t [U (q(t)) − cq(t) − βX (t)] dt
W2 =
∫ T
t∗
e−r t
[
U (qg + q(t)) − cgqg − cq(t) − βX (t)
]
dt
and
W3 = e−rT
[
U (q) − cgqg − βX
r
]
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Concerning pollution damages, let us define
Ω1 =
∫ t∗
0
e−r t [βX (t)] dt,Ω2 =
∫ T
t∗
e−r t [βX (t)] dt,
Ω3 =
∫ ∞
T
e−r t [βX (t)] dt.
For ease of computation, we assume a quadratic utility function, U (Q) = AQ−(1/2)Q2.
For our base-line scenarion, we set r = 0.01, c = 1.25, cg = 4, A = 20 , qg = 5, S0 = 2000
and X0 = 100. Concerning pollution, we assume that β = 0.01, μ = βr = 1, and η = 1.5.
We find that phase 1 starts with the initial price p(0) = 3.78 and ends at time t∗ = 18.9,
and phase 2 ends at time T = 247.14, with p(T ) = 15.The welfare calculations reveal that∑
Wi = 13, 047 and ∑Ωi = 1, 527. The ratios of damages to welfare is 11.7%.
4 Policy Scenario Analysis
This section moves to the second-best world. We intially describe in more details the so-called
Business-as-usual (BAU) scenario—i.e., assuming that there is no government intervention
(the carbon tax is zero identically, and there is no subsidy on the clean energy). Next, we
build on this situation to analyse the effects of two second best policies: (i) subsidizing the
clean energy and (ii) expansion of the clean energy capacity.
4.1 Sequential Determination of the Key Variables
We must determine the two endogenous times t#g and T , and the initial price p0, as functions
of the capacity qg and the subsidy s ≥ 0 on the clean energy. The subsidy reduces the firm’s
unit cost of clean energy from cg to c#g(s) = cg − s.We assume that c#g(s) > c. Recall that
x stands for the number of years it would take for the price p to rise from p = cg to p = p,
i.e., x = (1/r) [ln (p − c) − ln (cg − c)]. Let S˜ denote the required amount of fossil fuel
that meets the residual energy demand during the final x years of Phase 2.
Given s, let t#g be the time at which the price reaches the private cost value c#g(s). When
s > 0, we have t#g < t∗ (the time at which the price reaches the production cost cg). Thus we
have the following relationships
T = t∗ + (1/r) [ln (p − c) − ln (cg − c)] (5)
t#g = t∗ − h(s) (6)
where h(s) is defined as
h(s) ≡ (1/r)
[
ln(cg − c) − ln(c#g(s) − c)
]
. (7)
The cumulative demand for energy from time 0 to the time t∗, net of the cumulative green
energy supplied over the time interval h(s) must equal the initial resource stock minus S˜ (the
quantity of oil needed for the final x years of Phase 2):
∫ t∗
0
D(p(t))dt − qgh(s) = S0 − S˜
where p(t) = c + (cg − c)e−r(t∗−t).
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The equation
F(t∗, s, qg) ≡
∫ t∗
0
D(p(t))dt − qgh(s) − S0 + S˜ = 0 (8)
uniquely determines t∗ as function of s and qg. Indeed, we can show that t∗ increases with
s and with the clean energy capacity. After solving for t∗, we can next determine T from
T = t∗ + x , and t#g from t#g = t∗ − h(s). Then, knowing T , we use the terminal price p
(
T
)
,
i.e., U ′(qg), to determine p(0) and hence all p(t). Next, the stock of pollution at each time
t can be computed.
4.2 Comparative Statics
This section analyses policy scenarios in which policies aimed at reducing anthropogenic
carbon emissions may lead to a Green Paradox.
Following Gerlagh (2011), we say a “weak Green Paradox” is found if there is an increase
in current emissions in response to a policy measure whereas a “strong Green Paradox” is asso-
ciated with an increase in cumulative damages. In our analysis, a weak Green Paradox can be
identified as a decrease of p(0), which indicates higher initial resource extraction. Moreover,
in this paper we propose the new concept of an extreme Green Paradox, which describes the
situation where welfare decreases as a result of misguided (though well-intentioned) climate
policy. Our numerical calculations show the existence of extreme Green Paradox outcomes.
To assess the possibility of a Green Paradox, we apply the implicit function theorem the
key Eqs. (5), (6), (7) and (8) to determine the response of the endogenous variables t∗, t#g
and T as well as of price behavior, to changes in the exogenous parameters reflecting the
two policy scenarios. Subsidizing the backstop technology is captured by an increase in s
whereas an increase in q¯g (which implies a decrease in p) reflects the exogenous increase in
capacity.
4.2.1 Effect of a Subsidy for Renewable Energy
In the first part of our comparative static analysis, we investigate how subsidizing clean energy
affects the extraction speed of the exhaustible resources. It is well known that a subsidy can
have detrimental effects on the environment if the clean energy is available at a constant
cost without capacity constraint (Strand 2007; Hoel 2011). Our paper, however, assumes
that the backstop technology is capacity constrained. Various examples for such subsidy
systems exist: the renewable energy feed-in tariffs in Germany and Sweden or the exemption
of biofuels from taxation, to name just two. The following proposition summarises the effect
of a change in s on the endogenous variables; see the “Appendix” for details.
Proposition 1 An increase in the subsidy rate s for the clean energy output results in (i) a
lower initial price p(0), (ii) an earlier time at which the clean energy begins to be produced,
i.e., a decrease in t#g , (iii) a delay in the time at which the price p reaches the production
cost cg, i.e., an increase in t∗, and (iv) a delay in the date of resource exhaustion, T . The
decrease in p(0) indicates a weak Green Paradox outcome.
4.2.2 Effect of an Increase in Capacity
We now investigate the effect of an increase in capacity q3. This can occur as a result
of a technological innovation such as the introduction of electricity storage which allows
123
56 M. Gronwald et al.
Table 1 Summary of numerical results
First-best BAU Subsidy scenario Capacity increase
T 247.14 217.01 227.74 216.03
t#g 18.9 53.4 21.23 62.5
p(0) 3.78 2.82 2.66 2.72∑
Ωi 1527 1712 1611 1753∑
Wi 13,047 12,973 13,012 13,174∑
i Ωi∑
i Wi
0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13
massive expansions of wind generating capacities or a move from first-generation to second-
generation biofuels. An increase in capacity is equivalent to a decrease in the capacity-induced
choke price (p).
Proposition 2 An increase in capacity will (i) lower the initial price p(0), (ii) lower the
terminal price p, (iii) postpone the date at which the capacity will be used (the time at which
p reaches cg), (iv) shorten the phase of simultaneous supply of clean energy and dirty energy.
However, the effect on the date of resource exhaustion is ambiguous.
Having completed the analytical exercise, the following section now presents a numerical
analysis. This will further illustrate the usefulness of our model and some more refined results
will be derived. Furthermore, we conduct a welfare analysis of the second-best policies.
4.3 Numerical Calculation for the Business-As-Usual Scenario
The analysis is the same as in the first-best case, except the carbon tax is zero instead of μ.
We find that t#g = 53.4 and T = 217.01. It follows that p(0) = 2.82. Welfare and damages
are reported in Table 1.
Notice that the total damage cost in the BAU scenario is 1712 while under the first-best
policy scenario the figure is 1527.Thus the first-best climate policy reduces total damage cost
by about 12%.
4.4 A Politically Feasible Scenario: Subsidy on Clean Energy
Now suppose that the government cannot introduce the carbon tax. Instead, suppose the
government introduces a subsidy s = 1 per unit of clean energy, without affecting the
capacity. Then clean energy will be produced as soon as the price of oil reaches p = 3
(instead of 4 as under the BAU scenario).This represents a subsidy rate of 25%. The results
are reported in Table 1.
Total welfare under the subsidy is 13,012.This can be compared to the first best welfare
of 13, 047 and the BAU welfare of 12, 973, indicating that the subsidy on clean energy raises
welfare above the BAU welfare by about 0.3%. Thus, for our base-line parameter values
(q = 5 and β = 0.01), there is no strong Green Paradox.8 The welfare gains relative to the
BAU scenario is largely driven by bringing the date of clean energy production much closer
8 As a referee suggests, if the green energy capacity is much larger, so that the capacity constraint is “almost
non-binding”, almost all extraction would be moved closer to the present due to the subsidy, a strong Green
Paradox could arise. In Table 2, we consider very large capacities, qg = 15 and 15.9, and are able to numerically
confirm the result suggested by the referee.
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to the present (t#g is now 21.23 instead of 53.4), delaying the emissions from a substantial
part of the deposit. In fact, the total damage cost under the subsidy scenario is 1611. Thus
the subsidy policy reduces total damage cost by about 5.9%.
4.5 Politically Feasible Scenario 2: Capacity Increase
The policy of increasing capacity is very different from a subsidy. If the correct carbon tax is
in place, one would not want to use a subsidy. In constrast, in the case of capacity expansion,
even if one has the correct carbon tax, it will be welfare increasing to increase capacity if the
cost of capacity investment is sufficiently low. In what follows, we consider an increase in
capacity from qg = 5 to q ′g = 6. This represents a capacity expansion of 20%. Assume that
this involves an investment cost, denoted by K .
The results are reported in Table 1. With the greater capacity, the constant price that
prevails in Phase 3 is now p = U ′(6) = 14. This lower ‘peak’ price for oil implies a lower
initial price, i.e. p(0) = 2.72 instead of 2.82. As a result, under the capacity expansion
scenario, there is a short-term increase in extraction and hence short-term increase in damage
costs. This is a weak Green Paradox result. We will see below that there is also a strong Green
Paradox in this case.
Total welfare (before subtracting K , the cost of the capacity expansion) under the capacity
expansion is
∑
i Wi = 13,174. Note that given our base-line parameter values q = 5 and
β = 0.01, the welfare with capacity expansion is higher than the first-best welfare of 13,047,
the BAU welfare of 12,973 and the subsidy welfare of 13,012.9
The total damage cost under the capacity expansion scenario is 1753. The cumulative
damages in this scenario are higher than under the subsidy scenario (1611) and the BAU
scenario (1712). Thus, a strong Green Paradox occurs. In terms of the present value of the
stream of damage costs, Table 1 shows that a subsidy of 25% on the clean energy will
reduce total damage costs by about 5.9%, while a capacity expansion of 20% will increase
total damage costs by about 2.4%. The reason is that in our model with a binding capacity
constraint, a subsidy makes clean energy production profitable at an earlier date, without
changing the peak price of oil. These effects result in pushing the fossil resource exhaustion
date further into the future, so that the pollution stock peaks at a later date, T = 227.74. In
contrast, a capacity expansion reduces the maximum price that the last drop of oil would earn
(p falls from 5 to 4). This results in a strong incentive for fossil resource owners to increase
their earlier extraction.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
5.1 Sensitivity with Respect to the Damage Parameter
Since there is great uncertainty about the magnitude of potential damages associate with
carbon emissions, it is important to explore the sensitivity of our results to changes in the
damage parameter β. Recall that in our benchmark simulation, we set β = 0.01. In this
subsection we report the effects of considering two additional parameter settings: β = 0.02
as well as β = 0.08. Please note that this will result in proportional changes in the damage
costs in all scenarios except for the first-best case, where the carbon tax will be optimally
9 A referee points out that if β is sufficiently high, the Green Paradox effect will be so strong that welfare
(under the capacity expansion scenario) would decline (relative to BAU). We will report such a numerical
result in Table 2, thus confirming the referee’s point.
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adjusted, implying that the damage costs will increase by a smaller percentage. The upper
panel of Table 2 presents the results.
Among the noteworthy results we should mention a few comparisons. First, the welfare
effects of the subsidy are, for β = 0.02, not much different from those of the capacity
increase; for β = 0.01 the difference was substantial. Second, for both the subsidy and the
capacity increase, now negative welfare effects are found compared to the first-best case. For
β = 0.08 the Green Paradox effect associated with the capacity expansion is so strong that
the welfare is even lower than in the BAU scenario. We refer to this as an “extreme Green
Paradox” outcome.10
5.2 Sensitivity with Respect to the Capacity Constraint
In the benchmark case, we assume that green energy capacity is 5, and thus the steady state
price is 15. It is worth studying as well the case where the capacity constraint is almost non-
binding. We consider two alternative initial capacity levels: qg = 15 as well as the extreme
case, qg = 15.9 (and the steady state prices are p = 5 and p = 4.1 respectively). Note that
we continue to assume that β = 0.01. The lower panel of Table 2 reports the results.
For qg = 15 and hence p = 5, we find that, under the first-best carbon tax, the damage
costs are higher than in the original low capacity case. This is because the high capacity
implies a lower peak price for the resource, p = 5 (instead of 15), and thus encourages
earlier exhaustion. In addition, the difference between the damage costs under the first-best
and BAU is smaller than in the low capacity case. The total damages under the subsidy
scenario are slightly smaller than under BAU. At this large capacity of qg = 15, the subsidy
gives rise to a strong Green Paradox. The capacity expansion policy (increasing qg from 15 to
16) creates an increase in damages compared with BAU. Notice that with such an expansion,
the capacity constraint is no longer binding: p falls from 5 to 4, which is equal to the marginal
cost cg of the clean energy. At that price, demand is exactly equal to the expanded capacity,
16. As a result, resources are exhausted early on, bringing damages closer to the present.
Welfare under capacity expansion is however still higher than under BAU, because the steady
state price under BAU is p = 5 while that under capacity expansion is p = 4.
For qg = 15.9 and hence p = 4.1, we consider the effects of a capacity expansion to
qg = 16, or of a subsidy s = 1. Under the first-best carbon tax, we find that both welfare
and damages are higher than the corresponding values for q = 15. Compared with BAU, the
damages under the subsidy are higher and the welfare under the subsidy is lower; thus, there
are a strong Green Paradox (in terms of damages) and an extreme Green Paradox (in terms
of welfare). Concerning the effects of a capacity expansion, we find that welfare under BAU
is higher than under capacity expansion, which is an extreme Green Paradox.
6 Illustration of Policy Relevance
The model presented in this paper exhibits a considerable degree of flexibility and is able to
capture various empirical observations as well as challenges policy makers currently face.
To illustrate this wide applicability, this section provides (stylized) evidence that supports
this paper’s approach, showing that it is highly relevant. In addition to the crude oil market
application introduced in Sect. 2 and analysed in detail in Sect. 4, this section illustrates
10 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for encouraging us to consider this possibility.
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additional applications for this paper’s model for the analysis of the transformation of the
electricity sector.
As already mentioned above, the model presented in this paper can be easily extended to
allow applications to an oil market with conventional and unconventional oil as well as bio-
fuels as a clean substitute. The parametrisation of such an extended model (as in Grondwald
et al. 2016) generally reflects the cost structure and environmental impacts in this sector. The
consideration of two rather than one “dirty” resource would allow us to capture unconven-
tional carbon resources such as extra heavy oil, oil sands, and oil shale; see Gordon (2012).
Extracting oil from unconventional sites is more costly as well as more energy intensive and,
thus, unconventional oil has a higher CO2 emission intensity and extraction cost than con-
ventional oil. Specifically, in addition to various technological problems, biofuel production
raises land use concerns as probably there will not be enough (suitable) land available for
biofuel production and, even if there were, using it for that purpose might seriously compro-
mise food production and raise sustainability concerns; see, e.g., Sinn (2012). Thus, it seems
plausible to assume that there is a constraint imposed on the share of biofuels production. The
share of biomass from global primary energy supply is currently about 15%. This, however,
is to a very large extent attributable to so-called “traditional biomass”–the use of firewood,
charcoal as well as agricultural residues; see International Energy Agency (2012). The share
of biofuels in global road transport, however, is merely 3% and several problems indicate
that it is more than reasonable to assume that biomass is not a backstop technology that can
be used without constraints; see International Energy Agency (2011).11 Our model not just
allows us to capture this issue, it is furthermore possible to analyse the effect of changes in
this capacity. In light of the finding of possible negative welfare effects under the capacity
expansion scenario, the global biomass potential that actually exists would have to be seen
as a considerable problem.
Applications of our model are not restricted to the crude oil market: the electricity market
is another possible application for our model. The overall situation there is a similar to
the oil market example: Electricity is generated from both different “dirty” and exhaustible
conventional resources as well as clean ones simultaneously - despite the fact that renewable
energy is considerably more expensive than conventionally produced electricity. In order
to fight climate change, decrease the dependency on imports of energy resources as well
as the issue of resource scarcity contribute to the attractiveness of renewable energies. In
consequence, wind or solar power is used instead of (or at least in addition to) coal or gas. As
a result, policy instruments such as feed-in-tariffs or clean energy quotas are in place in many
countries. For example, Germany today generates approximately 20% of total electricity
from renewable sources such as wind and solar and the European Union aims at reaching
this share at the European level by 2020. However, further increasing this share seems to
be more challenging than originally expected. For example, substantial investments into the
electricity transmission and distribution network are required. What is more, the problems
of intermittent renewable energies and the considerable lack of storage facilities are still
unresolved. In addition to these technological challenges, there are also important regulatory
ones. The requirement of backup power plants to guarantee network stability sparked the
debate on an entire redesign of electricity market—the introduction of so-called capacity
11 Even though projections certainly indicate that there is a vast potential for biomass (for example, according
to International Energy Agency (2011), unused and surplus land has the potential of about 550–1500 EJ
biomass production in 2050), the way to exploit this potential is nevertheless long and stony. To mention
just a few of the challenges, crop yields need to increase considerably, and substantial parts of land needs to
be converted. In addition to that, International Energy Agency (2011) points to regulatory requirements and
stresses the importance of ensuring that food security is not compromised; see also Sinn (2012).
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markets is among the options. Finally, the requirements of the politically important so-called
triangle of energy supply—energy is supposed to be sustainable, affordable, and reliable—
effectively constrain the further development of renewable energies in electricity production.
In short, assuming that a backstop resource for electricity generation is unconstrained is
highly unrealistic. In light of our findings policy instruments aiming at an increase of the
capacity constraint of a renewable substitute are problematic. However, subsidizing this
technology and, thus, developing it to market maturity earlier may have positive long-term
effects. However, a detailed analysis of possible Green Paradox effects in the electricity
market requires a corresponding calibration of the numerical model.
Finally, our model is also be able to capture the issue of nuclear energy. This “conven-
tional,” but carbon-free form of energy is constrained by regulatory, political, and maybe
even (safety-related) technological restrictions.12
These reflections vividly illustrate the wide applicability of this paper’s model. It is fairly
obvious that applications of this model make an important contribution to current energy
policy debates. In a nutshell, the model applied in this paper is able to capture various
empirical energy market observations and the results obtained in this paper clearly indicate
that ignoring the important feature of capacity-constrained backstop technologies can lead
to inappropriate policy recommendations.
7 Conclusions
It is no exaggeration to state that climate change is among the biggest challenges mankind
has ever been faced. Thus, it is very important that we respond appropriately to this chal-
lenge. Perhaps for this very reason and perhaps just because we need to respond soon, this
challenge is particularly difficult. Economic analyses identified various well-intentioned cli-
mate policy measures in the past which, at first glance, appeared useful, but after taking a
closer look, turned out to be counterproductive. While this literature has a long history—
older contributions date back to the 1980s and 1990s—there is a recent stream of literature
sparked by Sinn’s (2008) discovery of the so-called Green Paradox. The basic finding of that
paper is that the owners of exhaustible fossil resources possibly bring forward extraction
of their resources as a response to intensifying climate policies. Because of the importance
of finding an appropriate answer, however, it is also necessary to use appropriate economic
modelling frameworks. If these frameworks are not designed carefully enough there is a risk
that inappropriate policy recommendations emerge from these research efforts.
Sinn’s (2008) original findings are very elegantly derived and are also intuitively very
convincing. However, in response to Sinn’s paper, a large number of papers emerged which
can be summarized as follows: the more realistic the modelling approach is the more detailed
the results become. This paper’s findings fit very well into this overall landscape. The
model used here allows to capture two important empirical observations. First, even though
clean technologies are generally available—wind and solar energy seem to be suitable for
replacing coal and gas power plants, cars could very well be run on biofuels rather than
conventional fuels, clean and dirty technologies are used simultaneously. Second, further
expanding and implementing clean technologies increasingly meets resistance. In more and
more countries, in particular Germany and the United Kingdom, there are significant local
12 Finally even the assumption that the constrained backstop technology is clean could be relaxed. The case
of a dirty backstop technology is studied in van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012a). Liquid fuels produced
with coal-to-liquids technologies serve as one example for a dirty but certainly also constrained backstop
technology.
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initiatives to oppose the installation of additional wind parks. Extending the use of biofu-
els is a major concern for organisations which care about food security and food prices.
Thus, there is sufficient evidence to assume that the use of clean technologies is constrained.
These very constraints are most likely the reasons why different types of energy sources are
used simultaneously even though costs associated with their use differ dramatically: solar
energy is still much more expensive than conventional electricity, to name just one exam-
ple.
As currently existing models are not able to capture these two observations, this paper
makes an important contribution to this literature. As stated above, it is important to use
appropriate economic models in order to avoid the possibility of deriving inappropriate pol-
icy recommendations. In addition, our model allows for the analysis of an entirely new
scenario: the expansion of the capacity constrained clean energy. The results indicate that
this scenario is considerable more harmful than a subsidization of the clean energy. In
addition, we show that the initial capacity size is crucial for the effects of the policy scenar-
ios.
Various channels through which a Green Paradox can occur have been discussed in the
literature: intertemporal arbitrage, spatial, technological, or extraction order effects; see van
der Ploeg and Withagen (2015) and Jensen et al. (2015). Intertemporal effects play a large
role in Sinn’s (2008) paper as well as in the earlier contribution by Long and Sinn (1985).
A technology-induced Green Paradox has been identified by Strand (2007). In this paper
the intertemporal channel is important but also the capacity constraint plays an important
role. The theoretical framework used in this paper is based on Holland’s (2003) analysis
of extraction capacities and the optimal order of extraction of exhaustible resources. This
model is re-interpreted and considerably extended to include emissions and pollution dam-
ages. In order to operationalize the concept of the Green Paradox in greater detail, this
paper, in addition, borrows from Gerlagh (2011) and considers different degrees of the
Green Paradox. In addition, the paper also introduces the concept of an extreme Green
Paradox.
What is fascinating to observe is that a large number of papers emerged only in response
to Sinn’s (2008) discovery of the Green Paradox. The theoretical framework used in many
if these papers is almost 100 years old and goes back to Hotelling (1930). For a surprisingly
long period this literature remained is a hibernation-type state. The oil price hike in the 1970s
provided impetus for deepening the Hotelling framework. In the 1990s, a number of papers
addressed the issue of global warming. In terms of climate implications of feasible second-
best policies, the big awakening came with Sinn (2008). What we can now hope is that the
concerted research efforts that paper sparked helps identify the responses we need to apply
if we want to keep climate change under control.
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Appendix
Derivations of Comparative Results
The effect of a change in s and qg (or, equivalently, in p) on the endogenous variables can
be computed as follows. Using Eq. (8), we get
∂t∗
∂s
= − Fs
F∗t
> 0 and
∂t∗
∂qg
= − Fqg
Ft∗
> 0
where
Ft∗ = D(cg) − r(cg − c)
∫ t∗
0
D′(p(t))e−r(t∗−t)dt > 0
Fs = −qg
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+ d S˜(qg)
dqg
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= −1
r
ln
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r
ln
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)
− 1
r
ln
(
U ′(qg) − c
) = −x#g < 0
Using the Hotelling Rule, p(0) = c + (cg − c)e−r t∗ , we obtain
dp(0)
ds
= −e−r t∗(cg − c)dt
∗
ds
< 0
Next, consider the effect of a subsidy on the length of Phase 1, t#g . Using
t#g = t∗ − h(s) = t∗ +
1
r
ln
[
c#g(s) − c
cg − c
]
we obtain
dt#g
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∗
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)
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The effects of a capacity expansion are computed as follows.
dt∗
dqg
= −
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− 1
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